UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA ALEXANDRIA DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA . Criminal No. 1:10cr485

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vs. . Alexandria, Virginia

January 22, 2015

JEFFREY ALEXANDER STERLING, . 1:25 p.m.

Defendant. .

EXCERPT OF P.M. SESSION

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TRANSCRIPT OF JURY TRIAL
BEFORE THE HONORABLE LEONIE M. BRINKEMA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

APPEARANCES:

FOR THE GOVERNMENT: JAMES L. TRUMP, AUSA

DENNIS M. FITZPATRICK, AUSA

United States Attorney's Office

2100 Jamieson Avenue Alexandria, VA 22314

and

ERIC G. OLSHAN, Deputy Chief Public Integrity Section of the

Criminal Division

United States Department of

Justice

1400 New York Avenue, N.W.

Suite 12100

Washington, D.C. 20005

FOR THE DEFENDANT: EDWARD B. MAC MAHON, JR., ESQ.

Law Office of Edward B.

MacMahon, Jr.

107 East Washington Street

P.O. Box 25

Middleburg, VA 20118

and

BARRY J. POLLACK, ESQ. MIA P. HAESSLY, ESO.

Miller & Chevalier Chartered

655 - 15th Street, N.W.

Suite 900

Washington, D.C. 20005-5701

COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION OF STENOGRAPHIC NOTES

		2
1	<u>APPEARANCES</u> : (Cont'd.)	
2	CLASSIFIED INFORMATION	
3	SECURITY OFFICERS:	MAURA PETERSON
4	ALSO PRESENT:	GERARD FRANCISCO
5		SA ASHLEY HUNT JENNIFER MULLIN, ESQ.
6	OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER:	ANNELTECE T THOMSON DDD CDD
7	OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER:	ANNELIESE J. THOMSON, RDR, CRR U.S. District Court, Fifth Floor 401 Courthouse Square
8		Alexandria, VA 22314 (703)299-8595
9		(103/2)
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Honor.

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4
 1
               THE COURT: I assume --
 2
               MR. TRUMP: That's fine.
 3
               THE COURT: All right, good. All right, so that's
 4
     11(a) if you want to put it in your packet.
 5
               Then if you look at, we've made the modifications we
     talked about to Exhibit -- to instruction page 24. We've added
 6
 7
     the exhibit numbers 142 through 145. That's the 404(b)
 8
     evidence exhibit -- I'm sorry, instruction, and we in the last
 9
     paragraph struck out "or crimes." So "the defendant is not on
10
     trial for any acts not alleged in the indictment, " all right?
11
               MR. MAC MAHON: Thank you, Your Honor.
12
               THE COURT: No objection to that, correct?
13
               Okay. Possession, which is 31, we have changed the
14
     tense to the past tense in the paragraph for Counts 1, 4, and
15
     6, so it says, "by a person who held an appropriate security
     clearance and had a need to know at the time the person
16
17
     acquired the classified information, " and then we've added the
18
     "namely, a letter related to Classified Program No. 1" in the
19
     next paragraph.
20
               Any problem with that new instruction?
21
               MR. MAC MAHON: No, Your Honor.
22
               THE COURT: All right? So make sure you replace that
23
     in your packets.
24
               And then the only change we made to 41, we had
25
     intended to have the date so that the jury doesn't have to go
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5
    back and forth rummaging through the instructions, so we've
 1
 2
     just added the dates that were alleged in that count. All
 3
    right, any problem with that? No?
 4
               MR. MAC MAHON: Not from the defense, Your Honor.
 5
               THE COURT: All right, then I believe we are about
     ready to bring the jury in. Are there any other last-minute
 6
 7
     matters? Were all the exhibits taken care of at the close of
     business yesterday? Was there any issue with any of the
 8
 9
     physical exhibits?
               MR. FITZPATRICK: No, Your Honor.
10
11
               THE COURT: I'm sorry?
12
               MR. FITZPATRICK: No, Your Honor.
13
               THE COURT: No? Mr. Olshan?
14
               MR. OLSHAN: As a housekeeping matter --
15
               THE COURT: Yes, sir.
16
               MR. OLSHAN: -- Exhibit 176 was a stipulation.
17
               It's the last one we moved in. The exhibit that goes
18
     to the jury just needs to be executed by the parties.
19
               THE COURT: Let's do that right now. So let me have
20
     176 pulled out of the stack. Do you have them?
21
               MR. OLSHAN: We don't have the official evidence
22
     binder.
23
               THE CLERK: No, I have it.
24
               MR. OLSHAN: May I approach?
25
               THE COURT: Yes. So you -- have you signed it? Has
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6
 1
     anybody signed it?
 2
               MR. OLSHAN: I don't believe so.
 3
               THE COURT: All right. So just pull 176 out.
 4
               Mr. MacMahon, while that's being done, was there some
 5
     issue you had as well?
 6
               MR. MAC MAHON: No, Your Honor.
 7
               THE COURT: Okay.
 8
               MR. MAC MAHON: I'm just taking the chance to stand
 9
     up.
10
               THE COURT: You can do that during, during the charge
11
     if you want.
12
               MR. MAC MAHON: I'll be fine, Your Honor. Thank you
13
    very much.
14
               THE COURT: I mean, frankly, you don't even have to
15
    be here for the charge. You know what I'm going to say.
16
               MR. MAC MAHON: I know, but I wouldn't do that, Your
17
    Honor.
               THE COURT: All right, that's fine.
18
               MR. OLSHAN: One moment, Your Honor?
19
20
               THE COURT: Yes, sir.
21
               MR. OLSHAN: We need to grab a copy of that one.
22
     It's just a stipulation. It shouldn't be an issue. If it's
23
     easier to --
24
               THE COURT: I'm sorry? You need a copy?
25
               MR. OLSHAN: The formal exhibit binder does not have
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8
 1
    defense index. Do you have one?
 2
               MS. HAESSLY: Yes, we have one, Your Honor.
 3
               THE COURT: All right. Hold on.
 4
               Ms. Copsey, would you go get that?
 5
               All right, any objection, Mr. Trump?
               MR. TRUMP: No.
 6
 7
               THE COURT: All right, that's fine. So the defense
 8
     list is in.
               Well, I'll tell you what, I want to start charging
 9
10
     the jury. Mr. Pollack, you can be looking at that at the same
11
     time. If there's an objection, we still haven't sent it in to
12
     the jury, and we can correct that afterwards, all right?
13
               MR. POLLACK: Yes. There are a couple of issues, but
14
     we can take them up later.
15
               THE COURT: All right. Mr. Wood, let's bring the
16
     jury in.
17
                              (Jury present.)
18
               THE COURT: Have a seat, ladies and gentlemen.
                                                               Thank
19
     you.
20
               All right, now that you have heard all of the
21
     evidence to be received in this trial and each of the arguments
22
     of counsel, it becomes my duty to give you the final
23
     instructions of the Court as to the law that is applicable to
24
     this case and which will quide you in your decisions.
25
               All of the instructions of law given to you by the
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- 1 | Court -- those given to you at the beginning of the trial,
- 2 those given to you during the trial, and these final
- 3 | instructions -- must guide and govern your deliberations.
- 4 It is your duty as jurors to follow the law as stated
- 5 in all of the instructions of the Court and to apply these
- 6 | rules of law to the facts as you find them from the evidence
- 7 received during the trial.
- 8 Counsel have quite properly referred to some of the
- 9 applicable rules of law to you in their closing arguments. If,
- 10 however, any difference appears to you between the law as
- 11 stated by counsel and that as stated by the Court in these
- 12 | instructions, you are, of course, to be governed by the
- instructions given to you by the Court.
- 14 You are not to single out any one instruction alone
- 15 as stating the law but must consider all of the instructions as
- 16 | a whole in reaching your decisions.
- 17 Neither are you to be concerned with the wisdom of
- 18 any rule of law stated by the Court. Regardless of any opinion
- 19 | you may have as to what the law ought to be, it would be a
- 20 violation of your sworn duty to base any part of your verdict
- 21 upon any other view or opinion of the law than that given in
- 22 | these instructions of the Court, just as it would be a
- 23 | violation of your sworn duty as judges of the facts to base
- 24 your verdict upon anything but the evidence received in the
- 25 case.

You were chosen as jurors for this trial in order to evaluate all of the evidence received and to decide each of the factual questions presented by the allegations brought by the government in the indictment and the pleas of not guilty of the defendant.

In deciding the issues presented to you for decision in this trial, you must not be persuaded by bias, prejudice, or sympathy for or against any of the parties to this case or by any public opinion.

Justice through trial by jury depends upon the willingness of each individual juror to seek the truth from the same evidence presented to all of the jurors here in the courtroom and to arrive at a verdict by applying the same rules of law as are now being given to each of you in these instructions.

During this trial, I permitted you to take notes. As I advised you at the beginning of the trial, many courts do not permit note taking by jurors. You are instructed that your notes are only a tool to aid your own individual memory, and you should not compare your notes with those of other jurors in determining the content of any testimony or in evaluating the importance of any evidence.

Moreover, you are 12 coequal judges of the facts.

The memory or opinions about the evidence of a juror who took extensive notes is no more or less deserving of consideration

than the memory or opinions about the evidence held by a juror who took few or no notes. Your notes are not evidence and are by no means a complete outline of the proceedings or even a list of the highlights of the trial. Above all, your memory should be your greatest asset when it comes time to deliberate and render a decision in this case.

Now, the evidence in this case consists of the sworn testimony of the witnesses, regardless of who may have called them, all exhibits received in evidence, regardless of who may have produced them, and all stipulations of fact agreed to by the parties.

Any proposed testimony or proposed exhibit to which an objection was sustained by the Court and any testimony or exhibit ordered stricken by the Court must be entirely disregarded. Anything you may have seen or heard outside the courtroom is not proper evidence and must be entirely disregarded.

Questions of the lawyers are not evidence. Only a witness's answer to a question is evidence. Objections, statements, and arguments of counsel are not evidence in the case.

You are to base your verdict only on the evidence received during the trial. In your consideration of the evidence received, however, you are not limited to the literal statements of the witnesses or to the literal assertions in the

exhibits. In other words, you are not limited solely to what you see and hear as the witnesses testify or as the exhibits are admitted. Instead, you are permitted to draw from the testimony and exhibits which you find reliable such reasonable inferences as you find justified in the light of your experience and common sense. Inferences are simply conclusions which can reasonably be drawn from the evidence received during the trial.

There is nothing particularly different in the way that a juror should consider the evidence in a trial from that in which any reasonable and careful person would treat any very important question that must be resolved by examining facts, opinions, and evidence. You are expected to use your good sense in considering and evaluating the evidence in the case for only those purposes for which it has been received and to give such evidence a reasonable and fair construction in the light of your common knowledge of the natural tendencies and inclinations of human beings.

If any reference to a witness's testimony or the exhibits either by the Court or by counsel does not coincide with your own memory of the evidence, it is your memory of the evidence which controls during your deliberations and not that of the Court or of counsel.

It is the duty of the Court to admonish an attorney who out of zeal for his or her cause does something which I

- 1 | feel is not in keeping with the rules of evidence or procedure.
- 2 You are to draw absolutely no inference against the side to
- 3 | whom an admonition of the Court may have been addressed during
- 4 the trial of this case.

And during the course of the trial, I occasionally asked questions of a witness. Do not assume that I hold any opinion on the matters to which my questions may relate. The Court may ask a question simply to clarify a matter, not to

help one side of the case or hurt the other side.

It is the sworn duty of an attorney on each side of a case to object when the other side offers testimony or exhibits which that attorney believes is not entirely admissible -- or properly admissible. Only by raising an objection can a lawyer request and obtain a ruling from the Court on the admissibility of the evidence being offered by the other side. You should not be influenced against an attorney or the attorney's client because the attorney has made objections.

Moreover, do not attempt to interpret my rulings on objections as somehow indicating to you who I believe should win or lose the case.

Now, I'm going to talk in these next set of instructions a little bit about evidence. There are two types of evidence which are generally presented during a trial -- direct evidence and circumstantial evidence. Direct evidence is the testimony of a person who asserts or claims to have

- 1 actual knowledge of a fact, such as an eyewitness.
- 2 | Circumstantial evidence is proof of a chain of facts and
- 3 circumstances indicating the existence of a fact.
- 4 And I have a standard example I always give to juries
- 5 about circumstantial evidence. You leave your home one morning
- 6 | in, let's say it's February. It's been cold out, but your
- 7 | front yard is bare. There's no snow on the ground. And you
- 8 | leave, let's say, at 9:00 in the morning, and you come home at
- 9 1:00 in the afternoon.
- Now, in the meantime, it has snowed, and when you
- 11 | come home at 1:00, there's a white blanket of snow in your
- 12 front yard, and you see a footprint in that snow. You do not
- 13 | see a person, but you see the facts -- you have the facts I've
- 14 just given you.
- Now, you have direct evidence that it has snowed.
- 16 You know what time you left the house, you know what time
- 17 | you've come back, you see the footprint, and you know from
- 18 ordinary human experience a human being normally is associated
- 19 | with a footprint.
- 20 From those facts, you can draw the inference that
- 21 | there was a person in your yard sometime between nine and one,
- 22 | although you never saw the person. That's an example of
- 23 | circumstantial evidence.
- Now, the law makes absolutely no distinction between
- 25 | the weight or value to be given to either direct or

1 circumstantial evidence, nor is a greater degree of certainty

2 required of circumstantial evidence than of direct evidence.

3 In other words, you should weigh all the evidence in the case

4 in reaching your verdict.

During this trial, documents have been entered into evidence that have had words and phrases and sometimes entire paragraphs redacted or deleted. In other instances, you have seen that there have been words or phrases substituted for the original words or phrases that may appear in a document.

I have decided to allow substitutions and redactions in this fashion to protect national security interests. Many of the substitutions and redactions pertain to names and specific locations, and those specific names themselves are simply not relevant to the issues at hand. Sometimes I have permitted substitutions and redactions to protect sensitive and highly classified matters, most of which have nothing to do with this case.

I caution you that you should not consider the manner in which substitutions and redactions have been used as an expression of my opinion regarding the facts of this case. It is your job and your job alone to decide the facts of this case.

A number of the exhibits received in evidence contain their original classification markings, such as Secret. Except for Exhibits 142, 143, and 144, which I will address shortly,

all of these exhibits are now unclassified. These unclassified exhibits are public, are public record documents and do not require any special handling procedures.

Because Exhibits 142, 143, and 144 remain classified as Secret, and you're going to know that because they have a red cover on them when you see them in the jury room, you may not communicate the contents of these exhibits to anyone after this trial is concluded. You should drew no inference as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant from the fact that you cannot communicate anything about these exhibits.

Now, certain charts and summaries have been shown to you in order to help explain the facts disclosed by the books, records, and other documents which are in evidence in the case. Such charts or summaries are not in and of themselves evidence or proof of any facts. If such charts or summaries do not correctly reflect the facts or figures shown by the evidence in the case, you should disregard them.

In other words, such charts and summaries are used only as a matter of convenience. So if, and to the extent that you find they are not in truth summaries of facts or figures shown by the evidence in the case, you are to disregard them entirely.

The next group of instructions talk about witnesses and how you go about approaching and evaluating witnesses, and this next instruction also addresses evidence.

In evaluating the evidence, always consider the quality of the evidence over the quantity. You are not bound to decide any issue of fact in accordance with the testimony of any number of witnesses which does not produce in your minds belief in the likelihood of truth, as against the testimony of a lesser number of witnesses or other evidence which does produce such belief in your minds. In other words, the test is not which side brings the greater number of witnesses or presents the greater quantity of evidence but which witness and which evidence appeals to your minds as being most accurate and otherwise trustworthy.

The testimony of one witness or just a few witnesses in whom you have complete confidence may outweigh the testimony of several witnesses in whom you do not have such confidence. Similarly, one or two exhibits which you find compelling may outweigh numerous exhibits which you find less compelling. So it is the quality of the evidence, not the quantity of the evidence, that you should be concerned with.

Now, you as jurors are the sole and exclusive judges of the credibility of each of the witnesses called to testify. Only you determine -- excuse me -- only you determine the importance or the weight that their testimony deserves. After evaluating the credibility of a witness, you may decide to believe all of that witness's testimony, only a portion of it, or none of it at all.

In evaluating a witness's credibility, you should carefully consider all of the testimony given, the circumstances under which each witness has testified, and every matter in evidence which tends to show whether a witness in your opinion is worthy of belief. Consider each witness's intelligence, motive to falsify, state of mind, and appearance and manner while on the witness stand. Consider the witness's ability to observe the matters as to which he or she has testified, and consider whether the witness impresses you as having an accurate memory or recollection of these matters. Consider also any relation a witness may bear to either side of the case, the manner in which each witness might be affected by your verdict, and the extent to which, if at all, each witness is either supported or contradicted by other evidence in the case.

Inconsistencies or discrepancies in the testimony of a witness or between the testimony of different witnesses may or may not cause you to disbelieve or discredit such testimony. Two or more persons witnessing an incident may simply see or hear it differently. Innocent mistakes in remembering something is not an uncommon human experience. In evaluating the effect of a discrepancy, however, always consider whether it pertains to a matter of importance or to an insignificant detail, and consider whether the discrepancy results from innocent error or from intentional falsehood.

After making your own judgment concerning the believability of a witness, you can then attach such importance or weight to that testimony, if any, that you feel it deserves.

The rules of evidence ordinarily do not permit witnesses to testify as to opinions or conclusions. An exception to this rule exists as to those whom we call expert witnesses. Witnesses who by education and experience have become expert in some art, science, profession, or calling may state their opinions as to relevant and material matters in which they profess to be expert and may also state their reasons for the opinions.

You should consider each expert opinion received in evidence and give it such weight as you think it deserves. If you should decide that the opinion of an expert witness is not based upon sufficient education and experience or if you should conclude that the reason given in support of the opinion -- reasons given in support of the opinion are not sound, or if you feel that it is outweighed by other evidence, you may disregard the opinion entirely.

A witness may be discredited -- and the technical term is "impeached" -- by contradictory evidence or by evidence that at some other time, the witness has said or done something or has failed to say or do something that is inconsistent with the witness's present testimony.

If you believe any witness has been impeached and

thus discredited, it is your exclusive province to give the testimony of that witness such credibility, if any, as you may think it deserves.

If a witness is shown knowingly to have testified falsely concerning any material matter, you have a right to distrust such witness's testimony in other particulars, and you may reject all the testimony of that witness or give it such credibility as you may think it deserves.

An act or omission is knowingly done if voluntarily and intentionally done and not done because of a mistake or accident or other innocent reason.

Now, during the trial of this case, the testimony of Mr. Merlin was presented to you by way of video deposition which consisted of sworn recorded answers to questions asked of the witness in advance of the trial by the attorneys for the parties to the case. The testimony of a witness who for some reason cannot be present to testify from the witness stand may be presented through a video recording played on a television set. Such testimony is entitled to the same consideration and is to be judged as to credibility and weighed and otherwise considered by the jury insofar as possible in the same way as if the witness had been physically present in the courtroom and had testified from the witness stand.

During this trial, you heard testimony from witnesses who are currently employed by the Central Intelligence Agency.

You also heard testimony from former employees of the Central Intelligence Agency, some of whom continue to work for the agency as contractors, and you heard the testimony of Human Asset No. 1 by video deposition and that of his wife. These witnesses testified either by using only initials or using a made-up name -- Merlin, that's a made-up name -- if you were not told their true names. These witnesses also testified with a screen preventing the general public from seeing them.

The disclosure of the witnesses' names and their physical identity could potentially compromise either their continued work for the CIA or expose them to safety issues.

As I have explained to you, one of your roles as jurors will be to assess the credibility of each witness who has testified during this trial. You should not make any judgments about the credibility of those witnesses simply because you do not know their full names or because they testified with the screen. Moreover, you should not consider the manner in which such witnesses testified as an expression of my opinion as to any of the facts of this case. Again, it is your job and your job alone to decide the facts of this case.

The defendant in a criminal case has an absolute right under our Constitution not to testify. The fact that the defendant, Jeffrey Alexander Sterling, did not testify must not be discussed or considered by the jury in any way when

deliberating and in arriving at your verdict. No inference of any kind may be drawn from the fact that a defendant decided to exercise his privilege under the Constitution and did not testify.

As I stated earlier, the law never imposes upon a defendant in a criminal case the burden or duty of calling any witnesses or of producing any evidence.

Now, the next series of instructions are going to talk about the indictment, which is the document used to bring the charges, and then the specific charges involved in this case, and we'll also be giving you some definitions of some of the terms that are involved in those charges.

An indictment is a formal method used by the government to accuse a person of a crime. It is not evidence of any kind against a person. Mr. Sterling is presumed to be innocent of the crimes charged. Even though the indictment has been returned against Mr. Sterling, he begins this trial with absolutely no evidence against him.

Mr. Sterling has pleaded not guilty to all the charges in this indictment and therefore denies that he is guilty of the charges.

A separate crime is alleged against the defendant in each count of the indictment. Each alleged offense and any evidence pertaining to it should be considered separately by the jury. The fact that you find the defendant guilty or not

guilty of one of the offenses charged should not control your verdict as to any other offense charged against the defendant.

In other words, you must give separate and individual consideration to each charge against the defendant.

The indictment charges that the alleged offenses were committed between on or about certain dates. Although it is necessary for the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that each offense was committed on a date reasonably near the date or dates alleged in the specific count being considered, it is not necessary for the government to prove that each offense was committed precisely on the dates charged.

The defendant is not on trial for any act or any conduct not specifically charged in the indictment.

Now, the government has introduced evidence that defendant had classified documents, and these are Exhibits 142 through 145, in his custody when his residence was searched. Evidence that an act was done by the defendant at some other time is not, of course, any evidence or proof whatever that at another time, the defendant performed a similar act, including the offenses charged in this indictment.

Evidence of a similar act may not be considered by the jury in determining whether the defendant actually performed the physical acts charged in this indictment. Nor may such evidence be considered for any other purpose whatsoever unless the jury first finds beyond a reasonable

doubt from other evidence in the case standing alone that the defendant did the acts charged in the indictment.

If the jury should find beyond a reasonable doubt from other evidence in the case that the defendant did the act or acts alleged in the particular count under consideration, the jury may then consider evidence as to an alleged earlier act of a like nature in determining the state of mind or intent with which the defendant actually did the act or acts charged in that particular count.

As previously stated, the defendant is not on trial for any acts not alleged in the indictment. Nor may a defendant be convicted of the crimes charged even if you were to find that he committed other acts, even acts similar to the one charged in this indictment.

Now, the defendant has been charged in the indictment with knowingly and willfully communicating national defense information to another not entitled to receive such information while being in lawful possession of such information. Count 1 charges specifically that the defendant caused national defense information, namely, information about Classified Program No. 1 and Human Asset No. 1, to be communicated, delivered, and transmitted to any person of the general public not entitled to receive this information, including foreign adversaries, through the publication, distribution, and delivery of State of War into the Eastern District of Virginia in approximately late

December and early January of 2006.

It's further alleged in Count 1 that the defendant did so while having reason to believe that this national defense information could be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation.

Count 4 charges that the defendant communicated, delivered, and transmitted national defense information, namely, information about Classified Program No. 1 and Human Asset No. 1, directly and indirectly to James Risen, a person of the general public not entitled to receive this information, between February 12 and April 30 of 2003. It's further alleged that the defendant did so while having reason to believe that this national defense information could be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation.

Finally, Count 6 charges that the defendant attempted to communicate, deliver, and transmit national defense information, namely, information about Classified Program No. 1 and Human Asset No. 1, to any person of the general public not entitled to receive this information, including foreign adversaries, through the publication, distribution, and delivery of a New York Times article in the Eastern District of Virginia between February 27, 2003, and April 30, 2003. And it's further alleged that the defendant did so while having reason to believe that this national defense information could be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage

of any foreign nation.

Now, the statute defining the offenses charged -- the offense charged in Counts 1, 4, and 6 is Title 18 of the United States Code, Section 793(d), and that code provides in part:

Whoever, lawfully having possession of, access to, control over, or being entrusted with any document, writing, . . ., or note relating to the national defense, or information relating to the national defense which information the possessor has reason to believe could be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation, willfully communicates, delivers, transmits, or causes to be communicated, delivered, or transmitted . . . the same to any person not entitled to receive it . . shall be guilty of an offense against the United States.

The defendant -- and I'm going to now talk about Counts 2, 5, and 7. The defendant has been charged in the indictment with knowingly and willfully disclosing -- I'm sorry, communicating national defense information to another not entitled to receive said information while not being in lawful possession of this information.

Count 2 charges that the defendant caused national defense information, namely, a letter relating to Classified Program No. 1, to be communicated, delivered, and transmitted to any person of the general public not entitled to receive this information, including foreign adversaries, through the

publication, distribution, and delivery of *State of War* into the Eastern District of Virginia in approximately late December and early January 2006. The defendant did so while having reason to believe that this national defense information -- I'm sorry, it's alleged that the defendant did so while having reason to believe that this national defense information could be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation.

Count 5 charges that the defendant communicated, delivered, and transmitted national defense information, namely, a letter relating to Classified Program No. 1, directly and indirectly to James Risen, a person of the general public not entitled to receive this information, between February 12, 2003, and April 30, 2003. And it's further alleged that the defendant did so while having reason to believe that this national defense information could be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation.

Finally, Count 7 charges that the defendant attempted to communicate, deliver, and transmit national defense information, namely, a letter about Classified Program No. 1, to any person of the general public not entitled to receive this information, including foreign adversaries, through the publication, distribution, and delivery of a New York Times article in the Eastern District of Virginia between February 27 and April 30 of 2003. And it's further alleged that the

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defendant did so while having reason to believe that this national defense information could be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation.
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Now, Counts 2, 5, and 7 involve a different subsection of Section 793 of Title 18 of the United States Code, and (e) provides in relevant part that: Whoever, unlawfully having possession of, access to, control over, or being entrusted with any document, writing, . . ., or note relating to the national defense, or information relating to the national defense which information the possessor has reason to believe could be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation, willfully communicates, delivers, transmits, or causes to be communicated, delivered, or transmitted . . . the same to any person not entitled to receive it . . shall be guilty of an offense against the United States.

Now, every crime has what are called elements. These are actually the essential components of that crime, and in a criminal case, in order for a person to be found guilty of a particular crime, the government must produce enough evidence to establish each and every element beyond a reasonable doubt. So if you have a crime with four elements and you're satisfied the government has proven three of those four elements beyond a reasonable doubt but not the fourth element, the government has not met its burden, and you would have to acquit the defendant

- 1 for that particular count.
- 2 So in order to meet its burden of proof on Counts 1,
- 3 | 2, and 4 through 7, that is, the counts I've just summarized
- 4 | for you, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt
- 5 the following elements:
- 6 First, for Counts 1, 4, and 6, that the defendant
- 7 lawfully had possession of, access to, control over, or was
- 8 entrusted with intangible or oral information relating to the
- 9 national defense.
- 10 For Counts 2, 5, and 7, the first element is that the
- 11 defendant had unauthorized possession of, access to, control
- 12 over, or was entrusted with a document, writing, or note
- 13 relating to the national defense.
- 14 So the first element is different for Counts 1, 4,
- 15 and 6. It's one first element. There's a different first
- lelement for Counts 2, 5, and 7. But the second, third, and
- 17 | fourth elements for these offenses are the same.
- 18 The second element -- this applies then to all of
- 19 | those counts -- is that the defendant had reason to believe
- 20 | that this national defense information could be used to the
- 21 | injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign
- 22 nation.
- The third element that's common to all of those
- 24 | counts is that the defendant willfully communicated, delivered,
- 25 transmitted, or caused to be communicated, delivered, or

transmitted this national defense information.

And the fourth element common to all of those counts is that the defendant did so to a person not entitled to receive it. A person is not entitled to receive classified information if he did not hold a security clearance or if he holds a security clearance but has no need to know the information.

Now, the word "possess" means to own or to exert control over something. The word "possession" can take on several different but related meanings.

The law recognizes two kinds of possession -- actual possession and constructive possession. A person who knowingly has direct physical control over a thing at a given time is in actual possession of it. The example is I'm holding this blue pen in my hand. I have actual, physical possession of this blue pen.

Now, a person who although not in actual possession, knowingly has both the power and intention at a given time to exercise dominion or control over a thing, either directly or through another person or persons, is said to have constructive possession of it. My courtroom deputy, Ms. Guyton, sitting right here, works for me. She's got the computer. If I direct her to send an e-mail message to my secretary, I at that time have constructive possession of that computer because I'm in the position to control how it's being used.

Now, you may find that the element of possession as that term is used in these instructions is present if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had actual or constructive possession of the thing at issue.

For Counts 1, 4, and 6, I'm now going to define two key terms: "lawful possession" and "unlawful possession," because that's what differentiates that first element for these counts. So for Counts 1, 4, and 6, a person has lawful possession of something if he is entitled to have it. In this case, lawful possession of classified information means possession of classified information by a person who held an appropriate security clearance and had a need to know at the time the person acquired the classified information.

For Counts 2, 5, and 7, a person has unauthorized possession of something if he is not entitled to have it. In this case, unauthorized possession of classified information, namely, a letter related to Classified Program No. 1, means possession of classified information by a person who does not hold a security clearance or by a person who holds a security clearance without the need to know, or by a person who holds a security clearance, has a need to know, but removed the classified information from the official premise without authorization.

The term "need to know" means a determination made by an authorized holder of classified information that a

prospective recipient requires access to specific classified information in order to perform or assist in a lawful and authorized government function.

For those first six counts, that is, for Counts 1, 2, and 4 through 7, the term "information relating to the national defense" broadly refers to all matters that directly or may reasonably be connected with the national defense of the United States against any of its enemies, including matters relating to the nation's intelligence capabilities.

The term "national defense" is a generic concept of broad connotation referring not only to military, naval, and air establishments, but also to all related activities of national defense preparedness. National defense information can be oral or intangible information.

To prove that documents, writings, or intangible information relate to the national defense, there are two things that the government must prove. First, it must prove that the disclosure of the material would be potentially damaging to the United States or might be useful to an enemy of the United States. Second, it must prove that the material is closely held by the United States government.

The disclosure of the information relating to the national defense need not cause actual damage or harm to the United States. Instead, potential damage or harm to the United States is sufficient to establish this prong of the essential

element.

In determining whether material is closely held, you may consider whether it has been classified by appropriate authorities and whether it remained classified on the date or dates pertinent to the indictment. Where the indictment has been made public by the United -- I'm sorry, where the information has been made public by the United States government and is found in sources lawfully available to the general public, it does not relate to the national defense. Similarly, where the sources of information are lawfully available to the public and the United States government has made no effort to guard such information, the information itself does not relate to the national defense.

In deciding this issue, you should examine the information and also consider the testimony of witnesses who testified as to the content and significance of the information and who described the purpose and the use to which the information contained therein could be put.

During the trial, you may have heard the attorneys refer to certain evidence or materials as classified information or that certain information was classified.

Classified information is information that has been determined pursuant to a system established by the Executive Branch to require protection against unauthorized disclosure.

As I have previously instructed you, when considering

- 1 Counts 1, 2, and 4 through 7, you are to determine whether
- 2 certain information in this case was national defense
- 3 information. That is not the same as classified information.
- 4 However, you may consider the fact that information was
- 5 classified in determining whether the information at issue was
- 6 national defense information.
- For Counts 1, 2, and 4 through 7, the phrase "with
- 8 reason to believe that it could be used to the injury of the
- 9 United States or to the advantage of a foreign nation" means
- 10 | that the defendant knew facts from which he concluded or
- 11 reasonably should have concluded that the documents, writings,
- 12 or intangible information relating to the national defense
- could be used for the prohibited purposes. In considering
- 14 whether or not the defendant acted with the intent or having
- reason to believe that the material could be used to the injury
- of the United States or to the advantage of a foreign country,
- 17 | you may consider the nature of the documents or information
- 18 involved.
- 19 The government does not have to prove that the
- 20 documents or information could be used both to injure the
- 21 United States and to the advantage of a foreign country. The
- 22 statute reads in the alternative, so proof of either will
- 23 suffice.
- If a defendant willfully causes an act to be done by
- another, the defendant is responsible for those acts as though

he personally committed them. To establish that the defendant caused an act to be done, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt:

First, that another person performed the acts that constituted the crime of unauthorized communication of national defense information or committed an indispensable element of that crime; and

Two, that the defendant willfully caused these acts even though he did not personally commit these acts.

The government need not prove that the person who performed the acts that constituted the crime of unauthorized communication of national defense information did so with criminal intent. That person may be an innocent intermediary or pawn.

The defendant need not perform acts that constitute the crime of unauthorized communication of national defense information, be present when it was performed, or be aware of the details of its execution to be guilty of causing an act to be done by another. However, a general suspicion that a lawful act may occur or that something criminal is happening is not enough. Mere knowledge that the unauthorized communication of national defense information is being committed without more is also not sufficient to establish causing an act to be done through another.

As I have instructed you, an act is done willfully if

done voluntarily and intentionally with the intent that something the law forbids be done, that is to say, with bad purpose, either to disobey or disregard the law.

For Counts 1, 2, and 4 through 7, an act is done willfully -- and I'm just going to repeat this because it comes through all the instructions -- if it is done voluntarily and intentionally and with the specific intent to do something the law forbids, that is, with a purpose to disobey the law.

Now, for Counts 1, 2, and 4 through 7, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt each and every element of these offenses as I have explained them to you. The government, however, does not have to prove that the defendant was the only person who communicated the national defense information alleged in the indictment. Your duty as jurors is limited to determining whether the government has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the offenses charged, irrespective of whether other persons may have communicated the same or similar information.

Now, we're moving on to Count 3. The defendant has been charged in Count 3 of the indictment with knowingly and willfully retaining national defense information while having unauthorized possession of that information.

Count 3 charges specifically that the defendant unlawfully retained a document relating to the national defense, namely, a letter relating to Classified Program No. 1,

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1
     at his residence beginning in or about January 31, 2002, and
 2
     continuing through approximately April 30 of 2003.
 3
               The statute, and this is another section of 793 -- of
 4
     Title 18, United States Code, 793(a) -- (e), 793(e), provides
 5
            Whoever having unauthorized possession of . . . any
     document . . . relating to the national defense . . . willfully
 6
     retains the same and fails to deliver it to the office or
 8
     employee of the United States entitled to receive it . . .
 9
     shall be guilty of an offense against the United States.
10
               And for this offense, for Count 3, there are two
11
     essential elements:
12
               First, that beginning in or about January 31 of
13
     2012 -- that's 2002; that's a typo -- and continuing thereafter
14
     through on or about April 20 of 2003, the defendant had
15
     unauthorized possession or control over a document relating to
16
     the national defense of the United States; and
17
               Two, that the defendant willfully retained the same
     document and failed to deliver the document to an officer or an
18
19
     employee of the United States who was entitled to receive it.
20
               The first element the government must prove for this
21
     defense is that the defendant had unauthorized possession of or
22
     control over information that relates to the national defense.
23
     The definitions I previously provided you with respect to
24
     unauthorized possession and information relating to the
25
     national defense apply equally to this count.
```

The second element the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that the defendant willfully retained the document in question and failed to deliver it to an officer or employee of the United States authorized to receive the document.

As I've instructed you already, an act is done willfully if it is done voluntarily and intentionally and with the specific intent to do something the law forbids, that is, with a bad purpose either to disobey or disregard the law.

Unlike the intent element for Counts 1, 2, and 4 through 7, for Count 3, the government does not have to prove that the defendant acted with the intent or reason to believe that his retention of the document could be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation.

Instead, the government only must prove that the defendant acted willfully as defined above.

Now, Count 9 of the indictment charges that between on or about December 24, 2005, and on or about January 5, 2006, the defendant caused to be conveyed without authority property of the United States, namely, classified information about Classified Program No. 1, which had a value of more than \$1,000, and came into the defendant's possession by virtue of his employment with the Central Intelligence Agency, to any member of the general public not entitled to receive said information, including foreign adversaries, through the

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publication, distribution, and delivery of the State of War for
 1
 2
     retail sale in the Eastern District of Virginia.
               Title 18 of the United States Code, Section 641,
 3
 4
     provides: Whoever . . . without authority sells, conveys, or
 5
     disposes of any record, voucher, money, or thing of value of
     the United States or of any department or agency thereof, or
 6
 7
     any property made or being made under control for the United
 8
     States or any department or agency thereof . . . shall be
 9
     guilty of an offense against the United States.
10
               And there are four essential elements for this
11
     offense. Again, the government must prove each and every one
12
     of these beyond a reasonable doubt:
13
               First, that the defendant conveyed a thing of value
14
     of the United States;
15
               Second, that the defendant did not have the legal
16
     authority to do so;
               Third, that the thing of value referred to in the
17
18
     indictment was of a value greater than $1,000; and
               Four, that the defendant acted knowingly.
19
20
               The word "convey" means to transfer or deliver or
21
     caused to be transferred or delivered to another.
22
     term "without authority" means without actual permission from
23
     someone who has the legal capacity to give permission.
24
               The term "value" can mean face value, par value,
25
     market value, or cost price, either wholesale or retail,
```

value.

whichever is greater. A thing of value can be any thing, including oral information or intangible property, that has

An individual acts knowingly if he was conscious and aware of his actions, realized what he was doing or what was happening around him, and did not act because of ignorance, mistake, or accident. Thus, if the defendant acted in good faith, he cannot be guilty of the crime. The burden to prove intent, as with all other elements of the crime, rests with the government.

Intent or knowledge may not ordinarily be proven directly because there's no way of directly scrutinizing the workings of the human mind. In determining what the defendant knew or intended at a particular time, you may consider any statements made or acts done or omitted by the defendant and all other facts and circumstances received in evidence that may aid in your determination of the defendant's knowledge or intent. You may infer, but you certainly are not required to infer, that a person intends the natural and probable consequences of acts knowingly done or knowingly omitted. It is entirely up to you, however, to decide what facts are proven by the evidence received during this trial.

Intent and motive are different concepts and should not be confused. Motive is what prompts a person to act or fail to act. Intent refers only to the state of mind with

1 | which the act is done or omitted.

Good motive alone is never a defense where the act done or omitted is a crime. The motive of the defendant is therefore immaterial except insofar as evidence of motive may aid in the determination of state of mind or the intent of the defendant.

This is now the last count that you have to consider: Count 10 of the indictment charges that the defendant knowingly and corruptly destroyed the March 10, 2003, e-mail from himself to James Risen that had a link to a CNN article about the Iranian nuclear weapons program. The defendant is alleged to have deleted this e-mail from his e-mail account with the intent to impair the e-mail's integrity and availability for use in an investigation before a federal grand jury empaneled in the Eastern District of Virginia between approximately April 18, 2006, and July 28, 2006.

Title 10 involves a violation of section 1512(c) of
Title 18 of the United States Code, which provides in part:
Whoever corruptly alters, destroys, mutilates, or conceals a
record, document, or other object, or attempts to do so with
the intent to impair the object's integrity or availability for
use in an official proceeding; or otherwise obstructs,
influences, or impedes any official proceeding, or attempts to
do so, shall be guilty of an offense against the United States.

There are three essential elements, again, all of

- which must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt in order for there to be a conviction on Count 10.
- First is that the defendant altered, destroyed,

 mutilated, or concealed a record, document, or other object, or

 attempted to do so, or otherwise obstructed, influenced, or

 impeded an official proceeding;
 - Two, that the defendant did so with the intent to impair the object's integrity or availability for use in an official proceeding; and
- 10 Third, that the defendant did so corruptly.
- The document destroyed need not, need not be material to the official proceeding.
 - An "official proceeding" means any proceeding, including an investigation before a federal grand jury.
 - To act "corruptly" as that word is used in these instructions means to act voluntarily and deliberately and for the purpose of improperly influencing, or improperly obstructing, or improperly interfering with the administration of justice. The defendant's conduct must have the natural and probable effect of interfering with the due administration of justice. The government, however, does not have to prove that the act of obstruction in fact obstructed the official proceeding or was successful.

In addition to the elements of the specific charges which the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt, as

to each charge, the government must also establish the venue of that charge in the Eastern District of Virginia because a defendant has a right to be tried in the district where the offense was committed.

Although, although the government has the burden to prove venue, it is not required to prove venue beyond a reasonable doubt. Rather, the government must establish venue by a preponderance of the evidence, which is a lower standard of proof and requires that it is more likely than not that at least one act in furtherance of that offense occurred in the Eastern District of Virginia. The government must establish venue as to each charged offense.

If the government fails to establish venue for a particular charge, the jury must acquit the defendant of that charge.

I instruct you that you must presume the defendant to be innocent of the crimes charged. Thus, the defendant, although accused of crimes in the indictment, begins the trial with a clean slate, that is, with no evidence against him. The indictment, as you already know, is not evidence of any kind. The defendant is, of course, not on trial for any act or crime not contained in the indictment. The law permits nothing but legal evidence presented before the jury in court to be considered in support of any charge against the defendant, and the presumption of innocence alone therefore is sufficient to

acquit the defendant.

The burden is always upon the prosecution to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. That burden never shifts to the defendant for the law never imposes upon a defendant in a criminal case the burden or duty of calling any witnesses or producing any evidence. The defendant is not even obligated to produce any evidence by cross-examining the witnesses for the government.

It is not required that the government prove guilt beyond all possible doubt. The test is one of reasonable doubt. And I can't give you a definition for that term. Those are not technical legal terms. English language.

Unless the government proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant has committed each and every element of the offenses charged in the indictment, you must find the defendant not guilty of the offenses. If the jury views the evidence in the case as reasonably permitting either of two conclusions, one of innocence and one of guilt, the jury must, of course, adopt the conclusion of innocence.

Now, this is the last instruction, and I know you've been with this for almost an hour. Upon retiring to the jury room to begin your deliberations, you will elect one of your members to act as your foreperson. The foreperson will preside over your deliberations, will be your spokesperson here in court, and will sign the verdict form on your behalf.

Your verdict must represent the collective judgment of the jury. In order to return a verdict, it is necessary that each juror agree to it. That is what unanimity means. In other words, your verdict must be unanimous.

It is your duty as jurors to consult with one another and to deliberate with one another with a view towards reaching an agreement if you can do so without violence to your individual judgment. Each of you must decide the case for yourself, but do so only after an impartial consideration of all the evidence in the case with all the other jurors. In the course of your deliberations, do not hesitate to reexamine your own views and to change your opinion if convinced it is erroneous. Do not surrender your honest conviction, however, solely because of the opinion of the other jurors or for the mere purpose of returning a verdict.

Remember at all times you are not partisans. You don't represent the government; you don't represent the defendant. Instead, you are judges, specifically, judges of the facts of this case. And your sole interest is to seek the truth from the evidence received during the trial.

Your verdict must be based solely upon the evidence received in the case. Nothing you have seen or read outside of court may be considered. Nothing that I have said or done during the course of this trial is intended in any way to somehow suggest to you what I think your verdict should be.

The punishment provided by law for the offenses charged in the indictment is a matter exclusively within the province of the Court and should never be considered by the jury in any way in arriving at an impartial verdict as to the offenses charged.

Nothing said in these instructions and nothing in the verdict form prepared for your convenience is to suggest or convey to you in any way or manner any intimation as to what verdict I think you should return. What the verdict shall be is the exclusive duty and responsibility of the jury. As I've told you many times before, you are the sole judges of the facts.

Now, a verdict form has been prepared for your convenience, and you will notice that it skips from Count 7 to Count 9. There is no Count 8 at issue in this case, so don't worry about the missed number.

You will take this verdict form to the jury room, and when you have reached your unanimous agreement as to your verdict, the foreperson will write your verdict, date and sign the form, and return with your verdict to the courtroom.

Let me go over the verdict form with you right now. So it begins with the caption of the case, United States of America v. Jeffrey Alexander Sterling, and it has the case number, and then we've listed each count.

Count 1 -- and you can go back to the jury

- 1 | instructions and find exactly what that count is referring to.
- 2 And it just says: "With respect to Count 1, unauthorized
- 3 disclosure of national defense information, and then it has
- 4 | the code section, "we, the jury, unanimously find the
- 5 defendant, Jeffrey Alexander Sterling, and there are two
- 6 | choices: Guilty/Not Guilty. "G" comes before "N," so the fact
- 7 | that Guilty is listed first in no respect suggests that that
- 8 should be your answer, but we have to put the thing someplace,
- 9 and alphabetical seems as easy as any other way of doing it.
- 10 And then we go through each count that way, so then
- 11 | there's a separate line for Count 2. Each one of these counts
- 12 gets an individual evaluation and individual decision, and
- 13 again, any decision as to any count must be unanimous.
- 14 At the very end then, the foreperson will date the
- 15 | verdict form with the date the decision, the final decision is
- 16 | made. We'll ask the foreperson to sign his or her name and
- 17 | then please print it underneath since we often can't read your
- 18 signatures.
- 19 Now, you will take this verdict form into the jury
- 20 room. You will also have all of the physical exhibits that
- 21 were entered into evidence, and I asked the attorneys to
- 22 provide you with an index of those, so you'll have the exhibit
- 23 | number and a little title of what the exhibit is to help you
- 24 find them because you have a lot of evidence in this case.
- I will also, I have to correct a few typos, but I

will have for you a couple of copies of these written jury instructions as well so you can refresh yourselves as to any matter that we've talked about in these instructions. You may take your notebooks with you as well.

If it becomes necessary during your deliberations to communicate with the Court, you may send a note signed and dated by your foreperson or by any of the other members of the jury, and you do that by knocking on the door and giving the note folded over to Mr. Wood, my court security officer. Of course, he is forbidden to communicate in any way or manner with any member of the jury on any subject touching the merits of the case.

No member of the jury should ever attempt to communicate with the Court by any means other than a signed writing, and the Court will never communicate with any member of the jury on any subject touching the merits of the case other than via writing or orally here in court.

Also, please bear in mind that you are never to reveal to any person, not even the Court, how the jury stands numerically or otherwise on any issue until after you've reached the unanimous verdict.

All right, counsel, approach the bench.

(Bench conference on the record.)

THE COURT: All right, you may have noticed as I read

I'm going to switch the word "communicate" on two of those

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1
     instructions. That's how I read them. They're just typed
 2
     wrong, okay, for those counts. Because we were using the word
 3
     "communicate" rather than "disclose."
 4
               MR. OLSHAN: That's fine.
 5
               THE COURT: Any objection from the government to the
     charge that's just been given to the jury?
 6
 7
               MR. OLSHAN: No, Your Honor.
 8
               MR. TRUMP: No.
 9
               THE COURT: Are there any changes, corrections,
10
     anything you want the Court to change?
11
               MR. OLSHAN: No.
12
               THE COURT: No?
13
               How about the defense? Other than the objections
     you've already put on the record, are there any additional
14
15
     objections to the charge other than what you've already
16
     objected to?
17
               MR. MAC MAHON: No, Your Honor.
18
               THE COURT: Are there any additional things you want
19
     me to tell the jury?
20
               MR. MAC MAHON: No, Your Honor.
21
               THE COURT: We're set to go then, right?
22
               MR. MAC MAHON: We have to get rid of two jurors.
23
               THE COURT: I know. We have to do the alternates.
24
     That's the next thing, okay. The practice here is that
25
     Ms. Guyton should have all 14 jurors' names in the box. Are
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50
 1
    you ready to do it?
 2
               Is everyone watching? All right.
               No, you do it.
 3
 4
               All right, who is that? All right, the first one is
 5
    David Harrison, Juror No. 42, all right? So he's the alternate
     No. 1. And the second one is Suzanne Yerks, Juror No. 101.
 6
 7
     She's No. 2. All right?
               Why don't you go back, and I'll excuse them.
 8
 9
               MR. MAC MAHON: Thank you, Your Honor.
               (End of bench conference.)
10
11
               THE COURT: Now, ladies and gentlemen, I know you've
12
     been a very smart and attentive jury, and I bet at least one of
13
     you has been wondering, There are 14 of us, but juries are only
14
     made up of 12 people. It turns out two of you have been
15
     selected to be alternates, and, Mr. Harrison, you're alternate
     No. 1; Ms. Yerks, you are alternate No. 2.
16
17
               Where's Ms. Yerks?
18
                              (Juror Yerks raised hand.)
19
               THE COURT: I want to first of all tell you folks we
20
     really appreciate the time you've spent listening to this case.
21
     Now, your job is not over yet. You will not be able to
22
     deliberate with the 12 people who remain in the jury. We have
23
     to have alternates because should any of you have had a family
24
     emergency or, you know, get sick, the flu is around, and would
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have been unable to come to the courthouse, we have to have 12

25

- 1 jurors in a criminal case. We would have had enough extra
- 2 people here to make sure we could get this case finished, but
- 3 at this point, I can't have more than 12 people in the jury
- 4 room.
- If, however, during the course of the deliberations a
- 6 | juror should get ill or for some reason before the jury is
- 7 | finished we lose somebody, then, Mr. Harrison, we would call
- 8 | you to come back in. And, Ms. Yerks, if we lost two jurors,
- 9 then we'd have to call you back in.
- 10 Therefore, it's extremely important, and I know this
- 11 is terribly unfair, but I have to keep you under the same
- 12 | caution: You must still continue to avoid any publicity about
- 13 this case. It was discussed on the first page of The
- 14 Washington Post this morning, so stay away from the paper or at
- 15 least go to the sports section. Do not discuss this case.
- 16 The 12 of you can't e-mail or send any notes or have
- 17 any communication with your two former colleagues.
- 18 If you will leave your phone numbers with Ms. Guyton,
- 19 | we will call you so that you know either that we need you back
- 20 here or the case is over so that you can then read the paper,
- 21 and other than anything you might remember about those three
- 22 | classified exhibits, there's nothing that prohibits you from
- 23 talking about this case, although again, you may want to
- respect the thoughts of your fellow jurors and not.
- But at this point, we're going to let Mr. Harrison

and Ms. Yerks go. Leave your notebooks here. We'll keep them 1 2 so that should you have to come back and deliberate -- and as I 3 said, do leave us a note with your phone number on it, okay? 4 And I think we can let you folks go right now, all right? 5 Thank you. We'll stay in session for another minute. You should check out with the Clerk's Office, 6 Ms. Yerks and Mr. Harrison. Let them know that you are 7 8 alternates so that you're not going to be coming back unless we have to call you back, and just leave your phone numbers, 9 10 unless we already have them. 11 Is there a problem? 12 (Discussion off the record between the Court and the 13 Court Security Officer.) THE COURT: All right. Well, you're going to get a 14 15 break now anyway, so what we'll do is this: We're going to 16 give you your afternoon break. What I would like you to do, 17 once the two alternates have left, so you need to step outside 18 while this is being done, the 12 of you decide who wants to be 19 the foreperson, all right? And then if the foreperson could 20 let me know in a written note how long a break you want to 21 take, all right? During that time, Ms. Yerks can retrieve her 22 cell phone from the car of one of the rest of you, all right? 23 And then you might want to decide how long you want 24 to deliberate today. There's -- once a jury starts 25 deliberating, the schedule can change dramatically. If you

- want to stay past 5:30, that's fine. If you're going to stay much later than that, I need to know so I can keep some heat on in the room for you. If you want to stop at 5:30, which has been our normal time, that's also fine.
- You should know also that if you have a question, I can't answer your question without running it by the attorneys, and so I require at least one lawyer per side to always stay in my courtroom. That does mean, however, that if you are going to be on a break, I can let those lawyers leave the courtroom for that time period.
- So anytime you take a lunch break or a coffee break, I want you to let me know, you know: We're breaking at this time for 15 minutes, and that way I'll let everybody go so that we don't waste your time. If you have a question and I have to track lawyers down, you know, you might wait a half an hour for an answer, and we don't want to do that, all right?

You also might want to think about what time you want to start tomorrow morning. As I told you, I have other matters unrelated to this case in my courtroom. You'll be my first priority, but the point is you can start at 9:00, you can start at 8:30, frankly, whenever you want to start, but you can't start until you're all together.

Jury deliberation is a collaborative process, and it means that each of you must be listening to the other discussing the evidence, so if someone's in the restroom, you

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54
 1
     should stop deliberating. If someone's run downstairs to get a
 2
     coffee, you've got to stop deliberating because it's important
     that you hear each other, all right?
 3
               All right, we're going to let the jury go now, and if
 4
 5
     you'd let us know who's going to be the foreperson, how long a
 6
     break you want, that will be just fine.
 7
               We'll recess court.
 8
                 (Recess from 2:46 p.m., until 4:22 p.m.)
 9
10
11
                       CERTIFICATE OF THE REPORTER
12
          I certify that the foregoing is a correct excerpt of the
13
     record of proceedings in the above-entitled matter.
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